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AXIOMS OF FACT POLARIZATION AND FACT
RANKING - THEIR ROLE IN
STARE DECISIS*
REED C. LAWLORt
"Somewhere beneath the welter there may be a rationalizing principle
revealing system and harmony in what passes for discord and disorder."
- Benjamin Nathan Cardozo
ABSTRACT
U NDER PRESENT NOTIONS of stare decisis, precedents have
been considered to be of little value because fact patterns hardly
ever repeat themselves. By taking into account fact polarization and
fact ranking, precedents can often be used to predict the outcome of
a new case even though the new case involves a new fact pattern.
Experimental results show that fact polarization and fact ranking lead
to consistency between cases. Other experiments show that reversal of
polarization leads to inconsistencies. These experiments support the
thesis that fact polarization and fact ranking are useful tools for analysis
and prediction of judicial decisions. Distinguishing cases on the basis
of fact differences may lead to invalid results if account is not taken
of fact polarization and fact ranking.
I. INTRODUCTION
For many years, decades, and even centuries, the literature of the
law has alluded to a science of law. The word "science" is ambiguous.
To some it means knowledge. To others it means system or organi-
zation. And to still others, it means something that can be expressed
in terms of axioms, postulates, and mathematical rules. Very little
effort has been made in the direction of developing a scientific method
of law in this third sense.
Some authors have recognized that the judicial decision is a func-
tion of the facts.' There are those who say that, even though this be
* © Copyright 1969, Reed C. Lawlor. The developments described here were
largely conceived during the course of research at the University of Southern California
Law Center under National Science Foundation Grant GS-1366. Computations were
made on the MH 800 at the USC Computer Laboratory. The views expressed are
those of the author and should not be attributed to the National Science Foundation
or others.
t Member, California Bar; Research Associate in Law, University of Southern
California.
1. F. POLLOCK, Jurisprudence and Legal Essays 169-70 (1961). Goodhart,
Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 YALE L.J. 161, 181 (1930). Oliphant,
A Return to Stare Decisis, (pts. 1 and 2), 14 A.B.A.J. 71, 159 (1928).
(703)
1
Lawlor: Axioms of Fact Polarization and Fact Ranking - Their Role in Star
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1969
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
true, it is of little help since the same fact situation hardly ever occurs
a second time. Consequently, they say, precedents are of little value
in predicting the outcome of new cases. Such conclusions have become
sacred myths to the law.
Even Sir Frederick Pollock, who hoped there could be a science
of law said:
The ultimate object of natural science is to predict events
to say with approximate accuracy what will happen under given
conditions. Every special department of science occupies itself
with predicting events of a particular kind. Note also that each
science occupies itself only with those conditions which are material
for its own purposes. The object of legal science, as we here
understand it, is likewise to predict events. The particular kind
of events it seeks to predict are the decisions of courts of justice....
In natural science we need an all-embracing fundamental
assumption before we can take any steps towards prediction; in
other words, before we can have any science at all. This assump-
tion is that nature is uniform. We act on the belief that whenever
the same conditions are repeated they will give the same result, and
we refuse to entertain any supposition to the contrary ...
Turning now to legal science, we find that an assumption of
the same kind is no less needed. In order to predict physical
results, we must suppose that the same thing always happens under
the same conditions; and in the same way, in order to predict legal
results, we must suppose that the same decision is always given
on the same facts. . . . The object is to ensure the same decision
being given on the same facts. In English case-law this object is
attained by what seems the most obvious and direct means, namely,
an understanding that the court shall follow the authority of
decisions formerly given on similar facts.2
Pollock, like others, failed to describe how precedents could be used
systematically to predict decisions when facts in new cases are not the
same as or similar to facts in old cases. The requirement that facts be
the same or similar is too restrictive. On the other hand, there may
be those who will argue that the methods described in this paper merely
represent a form of similarity. In anticipation of such criticism, it is
recommended that critics reflect now on what they mean by "same or
similar facts."
It is true that circumstances alter cases. But when should differ-
ences in circumstances be permitted to lead to an opposite decision?
And when should such differences still require the same decisions?
These are basic questions to which we will attempt to provide partial
answers.
2. POLLOcK, note 1 supra, at 170.
[VOL. 14: p. 703
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FACT POLARIZATION
Given the same facts, a judicial decision depends on the law. If
the law changes, the decision may change. The decision also depends
on the judge, since different judges often arrive at different decisions,
even when they agree on the facts and are acting under the same law.
Broadly, the decision function may be written:
d - f (F, L, J)
where
d the decision, PRO or CON.
F = the fact pattern of the case under consideration.
L = the law applicable thereto.
J the judge making the decision.
It is time to dispel the myth that precedent is of little value,
because the same fact pattern seldom appears twice. To do this, it
will be shown that there are some simple rules which can often be used
to predict the outcome of a new case from an old case, even though
the fact pattern of the new case is different from the fact pattern of
the old case; that is, at least, where the same law and either the same
court or the same judge are involved. The author has proposed a theory
of personal stare decisis leading to a unified model that takes into
account many different facts3 on a judge by judge basis. The theory
utilizes an axiom of fact polarization4 and an axiom of fact ranking.
This paper describes these axioms, simple uses for these axioms,
and also how they can be used for testing judicial consistency and for
predicting the outcome of new cases.
II. AxIoMs OF FACT POLARIZATION
AND FACT RANKING
The following discussion will make special reference to two
axioms: the axiom of polarization and the axiom of ranking. These
axioms are useful even apart from any advanced mathematical theory
of the judicial decision making process and can become powerful tools
for analyzing and predicting decisions.
3. Lawlor, The Chancellor's Foot - A Modern View, 6 HouSTON L. Rgv. --
(1969). Lawlor, Personal Stare Decisis, 41 S. CAL. L. Rzv. 73 (1967).
4. Some analysts object to the term polarization. Some seem to have a distaste
for the word because it has come to have a stormy political connotation. This is un-
fortunate, The term polarization was common in applied mathematics long before it
became common in political science. Others object to the use of the term polarization
as unnecessary and suggest the use of the word "dichotomy." But dichotomy is not
enough. The question is not whether presence and absence of facts have different
effects but whether the presence or absence of facts favors a "yes" answer to the
particular issues under consideration.
SUMMER 1969]
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Axiom of Polarization
According to the axiom of fact polarization, the fact patterns of
cases can be defined in terms of fact descriptors and these fact descrip-
tors can be so worded that the presence of a corresponding fact favors
a particular decision and the absence of that fact favors the opposite
decision.
Axiom of Ranking
According to the axiom of fact ranking, fact descriptors can be
ranked relative to each other in accordance with their relative strengths
with reference to a particular issue. A fact of higher rank has greater
strength or weight than a fact of lower rank. Fact ranks can often
help in the ranking of cases.
As will be seen below, fact polarization is a form of fact ranking.
Hence, the axiom of fact polarization is really a corollary of the axiom
of fact ranking. But since fact polarization is generally easier than
fact ranking, the two axioms deserve separate recognition. Cases and
judges may also often be ranked apart from fact ranking.
Reference Point for Polarization and Ranking
In order to appreciate what is meant by fact polarization more
clearly, it is important, first of all, to establish a point of reference.
Every lawyer experiences a visceral recognition of the concept of
fact polarization. He does this each time he prepares for trial. He
does it again each time he prepares a brief. Whenever a lawyer con-
siders presenting a fact to a court, whether it be in terms of evidence
or whether it be in a brief, he gives consideration to whether the pres-
ence of the fact is favorable to his client or is unfavorable to his client.
The focus in his case is the outcome for his client. Lawyers on opposite
sides of the same case look upon facts differently. If a fact is con-
sidered favorable by one party, more likely than not, it is considered
unfavorable by the other party. There will be those gray zones where
such simple categorical analysis will not apply. But this is immaterial
to the main thrust of the proposition being considered. There are
also qualifications which must be taken into account, but they, too,
have nothing to do with the main thrust of the proposition at hand.
In order to be able to consider fact polarization objectively, the
egocentric standard of the individual lawyer and his client must be
avoided. It is necessary to establish a standard to which all may make
reference and with respect to which the polarization of a fact descriptor
is fixed. The issue of the case is used as the reference point. The
[VOL. 14 : p. 703
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issue is defined as a question which a court is called upon to answer
yes or no. If the answer is yes, the decision is PRO. If the answer
is no, the decision is CON. A fact descriptor that favors a PRO de-
cision if the fact is present, is said to be positively polarized. One that
favors a CON decision if the fact is present, is said to be negatively
polarized. To provide a basis for analysis by scientific methods, the
issue should be broad enough to apply to many cases that are con-
cerned with the same kind of question. But the issue is not simply
a broad topic; it is a central question that arises repeatedly in cases.
The issue is usually the broad question upon which the outcome of
the entire case depends. The wording of the question determines the
direction or sense of polarization of applicable fact descriptors.
The focus of our attention is on issues that arise before particular
courts, particularly a court of last resort, such as the United States
Supreme Court. It is important to focus attention on a particular court,
or on courts at a particular level, because the polarization of a descriptor
as viewed by a court at one level is not necessarily the same as the
polarization of that descriptor when viewed by a court at another level.
The axiom of polarization assumes the existence of polarizable
facts. It assumes that the polarization of each fact descriptor is unique.
In other words, the axiom proceeds on the assumption that each fact
descriptor is monopolar, that is, that its presence favors just one side
of the case regardless of the judge, the presence of other facts, geog-
raphy, time, and other variables. When it comes to identifying those
facts and to defining their polarization, difficulties may be encountered.
Though some facts are monopolar and some facts are dipolar, the
difference is of little concern herein since most operative facts are
monopolar. Dipolar facts are therefore not considered in this article.
As previously mentioned, if a fact descriptor is positively polarized,
then the presence of the fact in a case favors a PRO decision; if
the fact descriptor is negatively polarized, the absence of the fact
favors a PRO decision. Conversely, if the fact descriptor is positively
polarized, the absence of the fact favors a CON decision. Similarly,
if the fact descriptor is negatively polarized, the presence of the fact
favors a CON decision.
Examples of issues are:
1. Issue in right-to-counsel cases.
Was the accused deprived of due process by virtue of his lack
of counsel at some stage in the proceeding?
2. Issue in search and seizure cases.
Were the circumstances under which the police made a search
and seizure of such a character that the constitutional rights
SUMMER 1969]
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of the accused were violated, entitling him to have the verdict
against him set aside?
3. Issue in involuntary confession cases.
Were the circumstances under which the accused made a con-
fession to the crime such that his constitutional rights were
violated by the introduction of the confession into evidence?
4. Issue in trademark cases.
Are the trademarks of two users of such a character that con-
fusion is likely to occur as to the origin of the goods to which
the respective trademarks are applied.
5. Issue in fair trial v. free press cases.
Were the activities by the press and other media in connec-
tion with the trial, of such a character that the accused did
not have a fair trial?
6. Issue in deportation cases.
Was the alien guilty of moral turpitude of a kind which
would justify his deportation under the Immigration Act?
7. Issue in rule against perpetuities case.
Should the gift in question be treated as valid under the rule
against perpetuities ?
These and other issues have been studied in the course of research
attempting to apply the author's theory of stare decisis. In this kind
of research, in order to form a data base from patterns of facts common
to the various cases which may be then subjected to various kinds of
mathematical analysis, it is first necessary to prepare lists of fact
descriptors and to polarize these descriptors.
If the fact descriptors are all polarized in the same direction, then
the presence of various facts is cumulative in favor of a PRO decision.
In such a case it is often easy to recognize whether one case is stronger
or weaker than another. But if the fact descriptors are not uniformly
polarized, the fact patterns are confusing and very difficult to compare.
Heretofore, little attempt has been made to polarize the description
of facts in opinions or in opinion analysis.
Fred Kort appears to be the first person to recognize that it is desir-
able to polarize all facts in the same manner, in order to simplify the
application of certain mathematical methods to the analysis of fact pat-
[VOL. 14: p. 703
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terns.5 In effect, Kort assumed that a weight could be attributed to each
fact and each fact could be described in such a way that the weight of
every fact, if present, added to the total weight of the case. This axiom
of weighting, together with the axiom of fact polarization, has led to the
first success in applying mathematical methods to the "prediction" of the
outcome of individual cases. It is important to recognize that if a mis-
take is made in the polarization of the fact, then it is necessary to add
something to the weight of the case if the fact is absent; or, alternatively,
it would be necessary to subtract something from the weight of the
case to account for the presence of the fact. Failure to polarize fact
descriptors accurately will result in error. Failure to polarize fact
descriptors at all makes mathematical analysis impossible or at least
unnecessarily difficult.
III. TECHNIQUES FOR POLARIZING FACTS
Once the axiom of polarization is accepted, one is then confronted
with the need of actually wording fact descriptors in such a way that
they are polarized in a known manner. There are three different ways to
determine the polarization of fact descriptors, namely judicial, statis-
tical, and visceral. The term "judicial" polarization refers to the fact
that judges often tell us whether the presence of a fact favors a "yes"
reply on the issue. The statistical method involves measuring the
relative frequency of occurrence of a fact in PRO cases and in CON
cases. According to the statistical method, a fact descriptor is con-
sidered positively polarized if the corresponding fact appears more
frequently in a greater proportion of PRO decisions than CON de-
cisions. Such proportions are called relative frequencies.
If cases occurred randomly and decisions were influenced by the
polarization, we would anticipate that positively polarized facts would
be present with greater relative frequency in PRO cases than in CON
cases, and negatively polarized facts would be present with greater
relative frequency in CON cases than in PRO cases. However, both
the parties and the lawyers act as filters for determining which cases
shall be presented and decided. At the appellate level, in those cases
where it is necessary to obtain the consent of the court to hear the
case at all, the appellate courts also act as filters. For these reasons,
one cannot rely upon the relative frequency of occurrence of facts in
PRO cases and CON cases to determine polarization.
If statistical methods alone are utilized for determining polariza-
tion, then the polarization of fact descriptors would oscillate with time.
Thus, for example, if a fact that occurs with a greater relative fre-
5. Kort, Predicting Supreme Court Decisions Mathematically: A Quantitative
Analysis of the "Right-to-Counsel" Cases, 51 Am. POL. Sci. Rev. 1 (1957).
SUMME.R 1969]
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quency in PRO cases is believed to be positively polarized, then fewer
appeals would be taken from PRO decisions when such facts are
present in lower court decisions. This would result in a reduction of
PRO cases on appeal. If we accept the proposition that upper courts
tend to uphold the decisions of lower courts, then we are forced to
conclude that there would be an increase in the relative frequency of
occurrence of those facts in CON cases. This would ultimately result
in a higher relative frequency of that fact in CON cases, causing the
statistically determined polarization of the fact to be reversed. Then
the number of appeals from CON decisions would increase. If it occurs
repeatedly, it would cause the statistically determined polarization of
a fact descriptor to reverse. This could go on and on, causing the
polarization to alternate from positive to negative and back again end-
lessly. It would be interesting to know whether this does occur in
fact. If so, this would suggest that legal institutions have been uncon-
sciously influenced by such statistics.
There is also the visceral methods of polarization. In applying
visceral methods to polarize fact descriptors, law students and attorneys
are asked for their "gut" reactions to the facts. They are asked
whether they feel particular facts, if present, favor a "yes" answer to
the issue. Though different techniques have been experimented with,
by far the best technique has involved wording a fact descriptor in
two contrasting ways, each being the negate of the other, or nearly so,
and comparing the two wordings.
One way to polarize fact descriptors effectively when concerned
with the analysis of Supreme Court decisions is to ask law students
and attorneys which of the two contrasting facts they would rather
have present in their case if they were representing the accused in a
hearing before the United States Supreme Court. If the issue is
worded to favor the accused, this question brings the issue standard
and the egocentric standard into coincidence, making it relatively easy
to view the facts viscerally. Figure 1 represents a list of contrasting
fact descriptors to test the degree of uniformity with which various
groups of analysts react viscerally to the fact descriptors.
Figure 1
EXPERIMENT IN POLARIZATION OF FACT DESCRIPTORS
ANALYAT DAT ...........----..........
Issue:
Was the accused deprived of due process of law by the introduction of the con-
fession in question into evidence?
In each instance below, indicate by a check mark which of the two parallel facts
you feel would have more weight with the Supreme Court in your case if you repre-
sented the accused. Stated differently: If you represented the accused, which fact
would you rather have on your side of the arguments?
[VOL. 14 : p. 703
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10. Petitioner was warned by a wit-
ness to the confession that what-
ever he said might be used against
him. - . . . . . . . . .
17. The request by accused for consul-
tation with friends was granted. -
24. Medical examination of petitioner
before and after interrogation
showed that adverse physical
effects had occurred.---- - -
25. "Relay tactics" were used by police
in interrogation. - .....
40. Many officers were present during
the interrogation. - -------
46. The accused took a requested lie
detector test. - . . . . . .
62. The question of admissibility of
evidence was argued in the pres-
ence of the jury. - -------
65. The question of voluntariness of
the confession was put to the jury.
Petitioner was told by a witness
to the confession that whatever
he said would not be used
against him. - ---- - ----
The request by accused for con-
sultation with friends was re-
fused. - - - --- -----
Medical examination of peti-
tioner before and after interro-
gation showed that no adverse
physical effect had occurred. - []
No "relay tactics" were used by
police in interrogation. - - -
Only one officer was present
during the interrogation. - - Q
The accused refused to take a
requested lie detector test. - - []
The question of admissibility of
evidence was argued out of the
presence of the jury. - - - - [
The question of voluntariness of
the confession was not put to
the jury.---------- [
Experiments with such contrasting fact descriptors have brought
forth nearly uniform results from different analysts. Most fact descrip-
tors are monopolar. Some are dipolar. Perhaps some are neutral.
Dipolar facts are difficult to handle. But dipolar facts can be replaced
by monopolar facts by taking into account the groups of circumstances
or the judges which affect the polarization. Dipolar facts are of two
kinds. In either event, a dipolar fact, if present, sometimes favors
a PRO vote and sometimes favors a CON vote. When the polarity
depends upon who the judge is, the dipolar fact is called bijudicial.
Very few examples of such a fact have been noted.
In Hudson v. North Carolina6 the attorney for two codefendants
withdrew as the attorney for one defendant and pleaded the other
defendant guilty. A number of the Justices of the Supreme Court said
that this event would bias the remaining defendant in the eyes of the
jury, while others said that this event would elicit the sympathy of
the jury for that defendant. All judges treated all jurors alike. Thus,
the polarization of the fact descriptor "THE ATTORNEY FOR Two
CODEFENDANTS WITHDREW AS ATTORNEY FOR ONE CODEFENDANT
AND PLEADED THE OTHER CODEFENDANT GUILTY" is positive for
some judges and negative for others.
It is often argued that the polarity of the fact depends somewhat
upon what other facts are present. However, examples are hard to
find. Such dipolar facts are amphoteric or chameleon-like. Like a
chameleon that changes color depending upon its background, such
facts change polarity according to surrounding circumstances.
6. 363 U.S. 697 (1960).
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However, the existence of dipolar facts is immaterial if we can
define conditions under which the polarity is in one direction and those
in which it is in the opposite direction. Since dipolar facts seldom
appear, and in any event, can be converted into monopolar facts, one
can assume that if facts are polarizable then they can be described in
such terms that the polarity is invariable. Accordingly, in the dis-
cussion below, it is assumed that we are concerned with monopolar fact
descriptors and that all the fact descriptors are positively polarized.
It is important to note that the polarization of a fact at the
appellate level often is exactly the opposite of the polarization of the
fact at the trial level. Actually, the recognition by the appellate court
of the polarization possessed by the fact at the trial level is often the very
factor that creates the opposite polarization of the fact at the appellate
level. Thus, for example, the failure of a court below to advise the
accused of his right to counsel favors a jury decision against the
accused. It is for this very reason that the failure below to give such
advice predisposes the appellate court to favor the accused. In this
field of law, the appellate court, in effect, attempts to compensate for
the bias below by introducing an opposite bias. This bias (in the most
complimentary sense of the word) is what creates forces for the achieve-
ment of justice under the Constitution.
IV. MATHEMATICAL REPRESENTATION
OF POLARIZATION
The polarization of a fact descriptor is somewhat like the inherent
sign of an algebraic symbol. Let us introduce the following terminology:
(f+) = This is a fact descriptor which is posi-
tively polarized.
(f- ) = This is a fact descriptor which is nega-
tively polarized.
Each of these fact descriptors is the negate of the other.
(f+) = (f- )'
In right-to-counsel cases, the decisions of the United States Supreme
Court often refer to whether the judge of the lower court advised the
accused of his right to counsel. Two oppositely polarized fact descrip-
tors are then possible:
c = The lower court advised the accused
of his right to counsel.
d = The lower court did not advise the accused
of his right to counsel.
[VOL. 14 : p. 703
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According to the axiom of polarization, one of these fact descriptors
favors the accused and one of them does not. Clearly these two fact
descriptors are inherently polarized at the level of the Supreme Court
as follows:
(f+) = The court did not advise the accused
of his right to counsel.
(f- ) = The court advised the accused
of his right to counsel.
The first symbol means that the corresponding fact descriptor is posi-
tively polarized on appeal. If the fact corresponding to the first fact
descriptor is present in this case, the presence of that fact favors the
accused at the Supreme Court level. The second symbol means that
the corresponding fact descriptor is negatively polarized. If the fact
corresponding to the second fact descriptor is present in the case, the
fact is unfavorable to the accused at the Supreme Court level. We use
capital letters to indicate presence values of facts represented by fact
descriptors, but incorporate the plus or minus sign as a suffix to indicate
whether the fact descriptor is inherently positively polarized or in-
herently negatively polarized. It follows immediately that
(F+) = (F-)'
Similarly,
(F+)'= (F-)
In other words, the following rule applies:
The presence value of a fact represented by a positively polarizedfact descriptor is the negate of the presence value of the fact when
represented in terms of the oppositely polarized fact descriptor.
The meaning and effect of polarization, and techniques for polarizing
fact descriptors have thus been described. It will now be shown how
fact patterns can be represented in terms of polarized fact descriptors
and how such representations may aid us in the analysis and even
prediction of judicial decisions.
V. FACT PATTERNS AND POLARIZATION
Suppose a fact pattern has been constructed for a case in a field
of law where six facts are important. Suppose further that when the
facts are represented by positively polarized facts, corresponding facts
1, 2, 4 and 5 are present and corresponding facts 3 and 6 are absent.
SUMMER 1969]
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If all the fact descriptors are positively polarized, the fact pattern of
the case may be represented as follows:
Figure 2
FACT PATTERN WITH POSITIVE POLARIZATION
1 2 3 4 5 6
+ + + + + +
Facts Present_ X X X X
But if the fact pattern of the same case is represented in terms of nega-
tively polarized facts, the fact pattern would be:
Figure 3
FACT PATTERN WITH NEGATIVE POLARIZATION
1 2 3 4 5 6
Facts Present.- X X
The second pattern says that when the facts are represented by nega-
tively polarized facts, corresponding facts 1, 2, 4 and 5 are absent and
corresponding facts 3 and 6 are present. On the other hand, if fact
descriptors 1, 3 and 5 are positively polarized and fact descriptors 2,
4 and 6 are negatively polarized, the fact pattern would be:
Figure 4
FACT PATTERN WITH MIXED POLARIZATION
1 2 3 4 5 6
+ - + - + -
Facts Present_ X X X
In the foregoing examples, the inherent polarization of each fact
descriptor has been indicated by the respective plus and minus signs
in the row directly beneath the fact number. It is to be noted that the
fact pattern of Figure 4 bears little superficial resemblance to those of
Figure 2 and Figure 3. Uniform polarization of the fact descriptors
introduces a degree of simplicity, whereas mixed polarization often
introduces a sense of confusion. For this reason, uniform polarization
of fact descriptors can be of help in the analysis of judicial opinions.
On the other hand, it is often necessary to introduce double
negatives to achieve uniform inherent polarization. This, too, intro-
duces difficulties. Regardless of the difficulties introduced by double
negatives, it has proved to be convenient to utilize sets of fact descrip-
tors having the same polarization. Uniformity of polarization of fact
descriptors can aid us in comparing cases.
12
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Ranking of Facts
Some facts clearly have more weight than other facts. In other
words, they have a greater tendency toward bringing about a PRO
decision. Experiments have shown that it is very difficult to rank
all facts, although some are easily ranked. Fact ranking is facilitated
by polarizing fact descriptors in the same direction.
In the right-to-counsel field, as in many other fields of law, the
following six fact descriptors apply.
1. The party was charged with a crime punishable by a death
sentence.
2. The party was charged with a crime subject to a maximum
sentence of life imprisonment.
3. The party was charged with a crime subject to a maximum
sentence of 20 years imprisonment.
4. The party was charged with a crime subject to a maximum
sentence of 10 years imprisonment.
5. The party was charged with a crime subject to a maximum
sentence of 5 years imprisonment.
6. The party was charged with a crime subject to a maximum
sentence of 1 year imprisonment.
If the facts corresponding to these fact descriptors have a different
influence on the court, according to which fact is present, it is easy
to rank these descriptors and this ranking should be the same for all
judges. An exception might occur, however, for a judge who con-
siders a life sentence more severe than a death sentence. Other fact
descriptors can often be ranked even though they deal with somewhat
unrelated subjects.
Fact polarization is a form of fact ranking. A positively polarized
fact descriptor has a higher rank than a negatively polarized fact de-
scriptor dealing with the same fact or kinds of facts. Reversal of polari-
zation produces a reversal of ranking. Thus, if R (f) means rank of
fact f, then the following equations are equivalent.
R (fl+)> R (f 2 +)
R (f2-) > R (f-)
VI. COMPARISON OF CASES
Lawyers often distinguish cases on the basis of differences of fact
patterns. It is not sufficient that the fact patterns be different to
explain or justify a difference in votes of two cases.
SUMMER 1969]
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Consider the following two cases:
Figure 5
RANKABLE PAIR OF CASES WITH POSITIVE POLARIZATION
Fact . -- 1 2 3 4 5 6
Polarization --- _ + + + + + +
Case 2- --.- X X X X
Case I- - X X X
For simplicity, let us assume that if a fact descriptor is positively
polarized, the fact adds to the weight of the case if the fact is present,
but subtracts from the weight of the case if the fact is absent. All the
facts present in case 1 of Figure 5, above, are also present in case 2;
but in addition, fact 2 is present in case 2, though absent from case 1.
Clearly then, by definition, the weight of case 2 is greater than the
weight of case 1. The set of facts present in case 1 is a sub-set of the
set of facts present in case 2. Two cases of this sort are called a rank-
able pair of cases.
Since, mathematically speaking, in a certain sense, either case may
be PRO or CON and the other case may be also PRO or CON, four
different permutations of voting patterns can be associated with these
two cases. Three of these voting patterns are consistent. One is in-
consistent. Suppose that we have two cases such as case 1 and case 2
just described in which the set of facts present in case 2 is a sub-set
of the facts present in case 1. And suppose further that the fact
descriptors are positively polarized. Then:
1. The two cases are consistent if both are PRO.
2. The two cases are consistent if both are CON.
3. The two cases are consistent if case 2 is PRO and case 1
is CON.
4. But the cases are inconsistent if case 2 is CON and case 1
is PRO.
If both cases are PRO or both cases are CON, the cases are said to be
interdependent. If case 1 is PRO, case 2 should also be PRO. If
case 2 is CON, case 1 should also be CON. Consistency of the type
just described is called convex consistency.7
Assume that you are representing a client for whom a "yes"
answer to the issue favors your client and that the facts correspond
7. Fisher, On the Existence and Linearity of Perfect Predictors in "Content
Analysis," 1960 M.U.L.L. 1.
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to those in case 2 above, and there is a precedent under consideration
which has a fact pattern corresponding to that of case 1 above. Your
opponent would be in error if he pointed out that case 2 is to be dis-
tinguished from case 1, because the facts are different. Differences of
facts would be an inadequate basis for distinguishing between cases.
This very distinction in the instant case, together with the polarization
of the fact would reinforce the argument that your case should be
decided PRO if case 1 was PRO.
In a similar manner, if the new case is case 1 and the old case
is case 2, and the old case is a CON case, then case 1 should also be
a CON case. But if case 2 is the old case and it is PRO, it does not
control the outcome of case 1. In the latter situation, convex con-
sistency would permit the new case to be decided either way.
If, perchance, cases 1 and 2 are both old cases, and case 2 was
decided CON while case 1 was decided PRO, regardless of all else,
this shows either that the judge made a mistake or that the polariza-
tion of fact 2 is incorrect, and this should be taken into account in the
analysis of other cases on the issue.
One case that is predictable from another in a set of cases is said
to be dependent on the latter. A case that cannot be predicted from
any other case in the set is said to be independent. These terms apply,
regardless of the order in which the cases are decided.
Similar comparisons may be made between two cases where the
fact patterns are the same, except that in each, a fact is present which
is absent from the other, and these two facts have a known rank
relation. An example is illustrated in Figure 6 below.
Figure 6
CASE RANKING BASED ON FACT RANKING
1 2 3 4 5 6
+ + + + + +
Case 2- - X X X X
Case I---- X X X X
In this example, cases 1 and 2 are identical except that fact 2 is present
in case 2 and absent from case 1, and fact 3 is present in case 1 and
absent from case 2. If fact 2 has a higher rank than fact 3, then case 2
has a higher rank than case 1. In this example the cases would be
inconsistent, if case 2 is CON and case 1 is PRO. In all other com-
binations of PRO and CON voting patterns for the two cases, the
two cases would be consistent.
Generally speaking, where two cases are identical except that each
fact present in the second case, but absent from the first case, has a
SUMMER 1969]
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higher rank than a corresponding fact that is present in the first case
but is absent from the second case, then the second case is of higher
rank than the first case. If the case of lower rank is PRO, the case of
higher rank must also be PRO. If the case of higher rank is CON, the
case of lower rank must also be CON.
Arguments based upon the distinguishing of cases are invalid if
they do not take into account the relative ranking of the facts. When
one case has a higher rank than another, both cases must be PRO
or both cases must be CON or the case of higher rank must be PRO
and the case of lower rank must be CON. Otherwise the cases are
inconsistent. If two such cases are inconsistent, they are said to
violate the principles of ranking consistency.
VII. TYPES OF JUDICIAL CONSISTENCY
Four types of judicial consistency (or lack of inconsistency) are
now readily identifiable in terms of fact patterns.
Identic Consistency
Where two cases have identical fact patterns, they should produce
the same results. Such cases exhibit identic consistency. According to
the classic theory, the results should be the same regardless of the
judge, but identic consistency between judges does not always exist.
If it did, there would be no dissent in any case unless there was a dis-
agreement about the facts. If two cases having identical fact patterns
are decided oppositely, the decisions are inconsistent. Such incon-
sistency between judges is particularly manifest in the opinions of those
courts where judges dissent and explain the basis for their dissent.
Fortunately the same judge rarely exhibits such inconsistency.
The term identic inconsistency applies where different results are
reached on the same set of facts. The term applies particularly where
the same judge reached opposite conclusions in two different cases with
identical fact patterns insofar as the reported facts are concerned.
Knowledge of fact polarization and fact ranking is not needed to
determine identic consistency and inconsistency. Excessive identical
cases are redundant in any set of cases.
Convex Consistency
Where all the facts applicable to a specific legal issue are polarizable
in the same direction, then if all the decisions are consistent with each
other, the PRO decisions can be separated from the CON decisions
[VOL. 14 : p. 703
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by means of a convex hyper-surface8 The term convex consistency is
applied only to pairs of cases in which the facts present in one case
are a sub-set of the facts present in the other case.
Ranking Consistency
Where two cases can be ranked one above the other, and if the
case of higher rank is CON and the case of lower rank is PRO, the
two cases are inconsistent. One case is of higher rank than the other:
1. If the two cases meet the sub-set requirement of convex con-
sistency; or
2. If each fact present only in the case of lower rank is of lower
rank than one corresponding fact present only in the case of
higher rank.
Inconsistency of any of the foregoing types very rarely occurs,
provided one polarizes the fact descriptors properly. The relative
frequency of occurrence of inconsistent cases is so rare that the results
of consistency tests support the validity of the axiom of polarization.
Random Consistency
Two cases are consistent if each includes at least one positively
polarized fact not present in the other and the two cases are not rank-
able on the basis of known rank relations of facts. Where two cases
bear a random consistency relationship, either case can be "distin-
guished on the facts" from the other. And neither case can be used
as a controlling precedent to argue what the outcome should be in the
other case on the basis of fact polarization or fact ranking. However,
this does not foreclose other methods of argument or prediction.
VIII. SOME EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS RESPECTING
FACT POLARIZATION
The main purpose of our research has been to develop methods
for finding the underlying personal equations which relate the decisions
of individual judges and the decisions of entire courts as a function
of the patterns of facts in the cases before them. This research is still
under way. Some results, however, have been reported. In the mean-
8. See note 7 supra.
9. Lawlor, Analysis and Prediction of Judicial Decisions - Informal Progress
Report, 1965 M.U.L.L. 132; Lawlor, What Computers Can Do: Analysis and Predic-
tion of Judicial Decisions, 49 A.B.A.J. 337 (1963). See Lawlor, Personal Stare Decisis,
note 3 supra.
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time, it turns out that some of the experiments performed have shed
some light on the validity of the axiom of polarization, and the axiom
of ranking. Two types of experiments help prove these axioms. One
type of experiment is called an "expectancy" experiment; the other a
''reversal" experiment.
Expectancy Experiment
In an expectancy experiment, we observe the number of dependent
cases and calculate from this data the number of inconsistent cases to
be expected if PRO and CON cases occur randomly among rankable
pairs of cases. These numbers are sufficiently large to attach some
significance to the fact that few inconsistencies were actually observed.
Assume that we have a set of N cases on a particular issue where:
p = fraction of cases that are PRO.
q = fraction of cases that are CON.
Further, in any set of cases:
R = number of rankable pairs of cases.
A number of pairs of rankable PRO cases.
D = number of pairs of rankable CON cases.
B = number of inconsistent pairs of rankable cases.
C = number of consistent pairs of rankable cases where
one case is PRO and the other case is CON.
If all the data are available, it can be arranged in a two-by-two
contingency table:
Figure 7
CONTINGENcY TABLE
higher
ra PRO CON
PRO A B
CON C D
If A, B, C and D are all known, then R = A + B + C + D.
In certain experiments (which were performed for other purposes)
the value of C was not measured and hence the value of R was un-
known. Only the variables A, C and D were measured. Nevertheless,
the number B of inconsistent pairs to be expected can be calculated
if polarization and ranking have no influence on the outcome.
[VOL. 14 : p. 703
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More particularly, if we assume that PRO and CON cases occur
randomly among rankable pairs, then the number of inconsistent pairs
(B) of rankable cases to be expected can be calculated from the num-
bers of consistent dependent pairs A and D.
In spite of the fact that the value of R is not known, a relation
can be calculated that should exist between the proportions of cases
which fall in the categories A, D and B. Thus, if PRO and CON
cases occur randomly in rankable pairs of cases:
A = p2R
D = q 2R
B =pqR
From these equations it follows that: B -Ax D
This formula says that if we multiply the number of rankable
pairs of PRO cases by the number of rankable pairs of CON cases,
the square root of the product should equal the number of pairs of
inconsistent cases to be expected in the absence of influence of fact
polarization and fact ranking.
Since both A and D are measured in certain cases, one can calcu-
late the expected value of B and compare the expected value of B
with the observed value of B. In other words, one compares the
expected number of inconsistent pairs of rankable cases with the
number of pairs of inconsistent rankable cases actually observed. Such
comparisons appear in Table 1 below:
Table 1
COMPARISON OF ACTUAL NUMBER OF INCONSISTENCIES
WITH EXPECTED NUMBER OF INCONSISTENCIES
r---- B-----
A D Expected Actual
Clayton 7 (U.S.)- 2 4 3 0
Fair Trial Free
Press (U.S.)_. 3 14 7 0
Deportation
(CA2 and CA9) 86 1 9 0 10
The Fair Trial Free Press cases used to compile Table 2 were
decided in the United States Supreme Court. In the data for these
cases the counts A and D apply only to dependent cases that were
interrelated by ranking of facts. Cases which could be ranked because
10. These results disregard an identic inconsistency which was found by an analyst
between two decisions of the Ninth Circuit. The two cases are Burr v. Edgar, 292
F.2d 593 (9th Cir. 1961) and Wood v. Hoy, 266 F.2d 825 (9th Cir. 1959). Careful
analysis of the facts reveals that the facts in Wood would require a decision opposite
from that rendered.
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they satisfied the convex consistency test were not counted since, in
this particular study, convex consistency tests were originally employed
in order to detect errors in analysis. It is interesting to note that
similar results are obtained when this type of analysis is applied to
the individual Justices in the Fair Trial v. Free Press cases. The data
obtained from such an analysis are set forth below in Table 2.
Table 2
r--B----
Justice A D Expected Actual
Black --- 2 4 3 1
Douglas 7 3 4.5 0
Clark -_ 3 12 6 0
Warren 4 6 5 0
Harlan -_ 3 4 3 0
Brennan 3 7 4.5 0
Stewart - 3 7 4.5 0
The only inconsistency observed for all the individual judges was
the inconsistency found for Justice Black. In this case, the flaw was
in the analysis. The analyst had omitted from the fact descriptor list
a fact which Black had considered important.
Statisticians will frown on the foregoing results because the num-
bers involved are small. The impact of the conclusion, however, is to
be found in the consistency of the results from one field of law to
another and from one judge to another. Where attempts were made
to polarize the facts uniformly, and in a positive direction, inconsist-
encies hardly ever occurred, even though a substantial number of in-
consistencies were to be expected because of the frequent occurrence
of rankable pairs of PRO decisions, and rankable pairs of CON
decisions. The conclusion is inescapable. The axioms of polarization
and ranking lead to an unexpected degree of consistency.
Reversal Experiments
In a second type of experiment, a study was made to determine
the effect of reversal of polarization. This particular study was applied
to the analysis of a number of cases concerned with the Rule Against
Perpetuities. The original data was prepared by a group of analysts
at Ohio State University."
No information was supplied by the original analysts regarding
polarization. Their fact descriptors appear to have been selected with-
11. These cases were analyzed by Robert J. Lynn, Professor of Law at Ohio
State University and a student, James Carpenter, now Associate Professor of Law
at Ohio State University.
[VOL. 14: rp. 703
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out regard to polarization. The descriptors were reworded slightly to
convert them to sentence form but without altering their polarization.
A number of persons working at the University of Southern California
attempted to polarize the (slightly reworded) fact descriptors. The
conference method was employed. The polarization of the facts was
discussed along with different methods of polarization and each analyst
recorded his own view. These fact descriptors were difficult to polarize,
and uniformity of polarization was not achieved. The lack of uni-
formity is exhibited by Table 3.12 In this Table a "-i-" represents
positive polarization, whereas a "-" represents negative polarization,
as determined by the analysts identified by the letters B, L, Z, S, and 0.
The heading F represents polarization determined by the statistical
method.
Table 3
STATISTICAL POLARIZATION (F) AND POLARIZATION
BY VARIOUS INDIVIDUALS
Fact
No. F B L Z S 0
1 - - - - - -
2 . . . . . .
3 + + - + + +
4 
- + - + + +
5 . . . . + -
6 + + + + - +
7 + + + + - +
8 . . . . . .
9 + + + + + +
10 - + + + - +
11 + + + - - +
12 + + + - + +
13 - + - + - -
14 - + + + - -
15 + + + + + +
It is clear from Table 3 that there is often high agreement as
to how a fact descriptor is polarized. However, there is also disagree-
ment. This data represents a real challenge because: (1) the analysts
who polarized the fact descriptors had nothing to do with the choice
of the fact descriptors or the analysis of the cases and (2) polarization
by different analysts was far from uniform. In this particular field of
law, many different gifts (bequests, et al.) are considered in the same
case and PRO decisions are rendered with respect to some gifts and
CON decisions are rendered with respect to others in the same case.
12. Table 3 is only a partial reproduction representing about one-third of the
facts polarized.
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Each gift was treated as a separate case for the purpose of analysis,
resulting in an increase from the number of "cases" from 27 to 320.
The body of cases included both trial court cases and appellate cases
from a total of thirteen states. Two of the cases having identical fact
patterns were reported to have resulted in opposite decisions. This is
an example of an identic inconsistency.
When tests were made to determine the number of inconsistencies
occurring with fact patterns based upon the various sets of polarization
set forth in Table 3, it was found that only two inconsistencies appeared
with the statistical polarization F and only one inconsistency appeared
for the polarization chosen by each analyst. On the other hand, the
initial random polarization produced four inconsistencies. As used here
the term inconsistency refers to the minimum number of cases that
must be disregarded to remove identic and other convex inconsistencies.
The results were not greatly different from those obtained with
the statistical polarization. The results are shown under the Column
(B) in Table 4. In other words, for the purpose of this analysis, the
disagreement between the analysts (B, L, Z, S, and 0) respecting the
polarization of the facts was immaterial. Polarization was difficult,
but differences did not matter in this test.
Table 4
RESULTS OF REVERSAL EXPERIMENT
Polarization (B) (C)
R 4 1
F 2 19
B 1 24
L 1 10
Z 1 17
S 1 20
0 1 16
Actually, in the case of the six analysts, four pairs of inconsist-
ences appeared but there was one case common to all four pairs. This
one case was also involved in an identic inconsistency. In this par-
ticular instance, therefore, instead of counting 4 for the total number
of inconsistent pairs, we have recorded a "1" to indicate that by remov-
ing one particular case from the data base, all identic and convex
inconsistencies would disappear. In the case of the statistical polariza-
tion, the same four cases resulted in six pairs of inconsistencies. Two
cases accounted for the six pairs of inconsistencies.
Then the polarization of the fact descriptors was reversed. In
such a case, as indicated previously in Figures 2 and 3, each fact absent
[VOL. 14 : p. 703
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was treated as its negate present, and each fact present was treated as
its negate absent. The number of convex inconsistencies then observed
is given under Column (C) in Table 4.
For the original, random, polarization (R), reversal of polariza-
tion resulted in improvement. The contrast in results between the
original, random, polarization and the systematic polarizations is statis-
tically significant to the 0.99 level. The fact that so many inconsist-
ences (C) appeared when the statistical polarization and the polariza-
tion by the analysts were reversed, makes out a strong case for the
conclusion that polarization of fact descriptors is important even in a
field of law where polarization is difficult.
While differences appear for the different sets of systematic polari-
zation, the differences are not sufficiently great to be statistically
significant. This test, therefore, did not prove clearly one way or
another whether statistical polarization or visceral polarization was
more effective. It merely proved that some polarization is good. Tests
are under way to determine what differences in results will be obtained
with various sets of polarization on the reliability of prediction methods
applied to cases involving random consistency.
IX. QUALIFICATIONS
The foregoing discussion must be qualified by the fact that there
is usually considerable uncertainty about the fact pattern for each case.
Experiments have shown'" that analysts have difficulty agreeing as
to what facts were in sight of the court as revealed by the opinion of
the court itself. The reliability of determining the presence or absence
of any particular fact averages around 85% to 95%, depending upon
the ability and experience of the analyst.
The uncertainty then of knowing what facts are present in any
case must be taken into account in any reasoning based upon fact con-
tent of cases. This is true, however, not only in the methods of reason-
ing described here which utilize fact polarization and fact ranking,
but even where one is applying methods which, like that described
by Pollock, 4 state that the same fact pattern should lead to the same
conclusion. Who knows for sure when two fact patterns are the same?
In a more fully developed theory of analysis, the uncertainties in
our knowledge about the fact patterns would be taken into account and
the ranking relation between cases would be expressed in terms of
probability. And the outcome based on polarization logic and ranking
logic would also be expressed as a probability.
13. See Lawlor, Fact Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions, 8 J.J. 107 (1968).
14. See Pollock, note 1 supra.
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X. CONCLUSION
The principal conclusion to be drawn from the foregoing experi-
ments is that the axiom of polarization is essential to any method
which assumes that the decision of a case depends upon the weight of
a case and the weight of the case somehow represents the sum of the
weights of the facts. The conclusion can be extended to more complex
decision functions.
Polarization of facts may often be easy but sometimes it is difficult.
In any event, it is clear that complete disregard of polarization intro-
duces serious errors in analysis. So far, fact ranking has proved difficult.
Fact polarization and fact ranking are two important phenomena
that should be considered in fact content analysis of judicial opinions.
The study of these factors is important to the development of a mathe-
matical theory of the judicial decision-making process. The utility of
concepts of polarization and ranking is not limited to mathematical
methods of analysis. These concepts are also applicable to non-mathe-
matical methods of analyzing legal problems.
By polarizing and ranking facts, it often becomes possible to
predict the outcome of new cases from old cases, even though the fact
patterns of the two cases are not the same. Furthermore, by taking
into account the polarization of facts, errors in legal reasoning that
may otherwise arise in distinguishing cases in the conventional manner
can often be detected.
The concept of polarization and ranking of facts may be helpful
in understanding how lawyers and judges feel about cases. They may
even be helpful in explaining some visceral reactions and hunches in a
logical manner. These concepts, it is submitted, merely recognize what
is old in the judicial decision-making process and hence represent aspects
of a rationalizing principle which can reveal system and harmony in
what has heretofore passed for discord and disorder. These concepts
merely make explicit what has long been recognized by lawyers and
judges alike. But explicit recognition of these concepts makes it neces-
sary to alter the prevailing views about stare decisis and precedents.
The old theory of stare decisis requiring facts to be the same to
warrant prediction and the prevailing myth that precedents have little
value because identical fact patterns seldom occur, should be replaced
by a system of legal reasoning that explicitly takes into account the
concepts of fact polarization and fact ranking. On this basis every old
case can be a controlling precedent for millions or billions of cases
having different fact patterns.
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